Patterns and Dynamics of National and European Identities in Central and Eastern Europe

Kseniya Kizilova (Research Fellow at the School of Sociology V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University (Ukraine); Vice-Director of the Institute for Comparative Survey Research "Eurasia Barometer" (Vienna, Austria); Head of Secretariat at the World Values Survey Association)

The paper is analyzing the structure, dynamics and interplay of national and European identities within the geographical space of the former Communist Europe and the Western part of the former Soviet Union. European identity, most broadly defined as one’s cultural and political self-identification with the European Union, is the forming-factor for the European community and precondition for the further development of the European project. For the European Union being founded on a community of values as listed in the treaties, alongside with the EU institutions being the “backbone” of the project, European identity performs the function of its cohesive “glue”.

The world economic crisis of 2008, the migration crisis of 2015, Brexit, the rise of far-right political forces promoting populist and nationalist agendas challenged the European identity, re-opening the discourse of the crisis of European identity and erosion of European core values. These and other developments have particularly affected the feeling of belonging to the European community in
Central and Eastern European societies where European identity is also challenged by the ongoing processes of national self-determination and formation of the national identity initialized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and associated with the so called feeling of “existential fear” for the own national and political community.

The paper is analyzing the cross-country differences and similarities in national self-identification and the feeling of belonging to Europe, and their changes over time in selected Central and Eastern European states. The paper examines which sets of social, political and economic values are associated with the low and high levels of European identity and how the interplay of European and national identities occurs. Paper employs method of principal components and multilevel modelling. The database of the paper is the World Values Survey and European Values Survey for the period of 1990-2019.

**Convergence of political values? A multi-level analysis of developments among EU countries 1990-2017**

*Pepijn van Houwelingen*, Plamen Akiliyski**, Jurjen Iedema* & Paul Dekker*** (*Netherlands institute for Social Research|SCP, **University of Oslo and ***Tilburg University*)

Diversity in basic core political values are frequently debated in the context of widening and deepening of the European Union (EU). From a perspective of European integration, a gradual convergence in core political values across European countries would be beneficial in order to strengthen cohesion, increase legitimacy and ease decision making. Thus, the EU assumes an active role in promoting certain values, which may lead to their stronger support among EU member states. Additional sources of convergence might be the freedom of movement and the gradual equalization of the living standards across the EU. Based on EVS data, developments in public opinion with regard to 9 political value indicators among 9 EU countries are assessed since 1990.

Our preliminary analysis reveals that the differences in core political values between these countries are considerable. The core political value of ‘socialism’ exhibited convergence between 1990 and 2017. Similarly, ‘progressivism’ values were converging across the EU until 2008 but following the financial crisis the disagreement on these values has reach a higher level than that in 1990. Data on ‘cosmopolitanism’ are limited to the period between 2008 and 2017, during which the countries have experiences a marginal convergence. With the release of the full EVS data we would be able to assess more conclusively the processes of change in country-level value diversity in the EU and offer explanations related to the role of the EU in promoting values and the effects of the financial, fiscal and refugee crises.

**Who drives the increase in authoritarian values?**

*Frédéric Gonthier (School of Political Studies, University of Grenoble, France)*

Electoral support for authoritarian-populist forces has increased substantially since the 1980s. Authoritarian parties are now in government in eleven European countries. Three competing hypotheses account for this surge. According to the standard economic rationale, populism is arising
when growing inequality mobilize the poor. For other scholars, authoritarianism can best be explained as a cultural backlash against social change. One alternative hypothesis assumes that younger citizens have become more critical of democracy and more likely endorse authoritarian attitudes.

This presentation will address the notion that authoritarian values are on the rise in Europe. In contrast with much of the extant research that emphasizes the influence of voting behaviors and authoritarian values at the country level, I will tackle this issue at the individual level. More specifically, I will examine which subgroups drive the increase (if any) in authoritarian values. Building on previous studies, I conceptualize authoritarianism as a multi-faceted phenomenon made up of three components: authority, conformity and security. The research will focus on the EVS items tapping public demand for authority since 1981.

Preliminary findings using a three-level modeling strategy show that public demand for authority is rising only in a few liberal and affluent democracies (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands). Most importantly, this increase is not due to the most extreme fringe of the electorate but stems from the most progressive subgroups (e.g., the youngsters, the most educated and left-wing sympathizers). Thus, exploratory results suggest that in consolidated democracies, a rising demand for authority may primarily express a growing need for public order and regulation from the most liberal segments of the population.

**Different Across, Similar Within? Educational Polarization in Social and Political Attitudes**

*Quita Muis, Tim Reesken, Inge Sieben (Tilburg University)*

Recent research assumes that influenced by e.g. globalization, the lower and higher educated are increasingly growing apart in their social and political attitudes (e.g. Bovens & Wille, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Some have even expressed concerns about education being a potential new basis for a full societal cleavage. When it comes to attitudinal polarization, previous research has mainly focused on increasing between-group differences, but fails to consider whether homogeneity within groups is increasing as well (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996). In this study, we investigate both aspects of the polarization process, and focus on traditional (post-materialism, religiousness, moral permissiveness and gender roles) and post-traditional attitudes (intolerance and political trust) in the Netherlands. Additionally, we explore whether differences in economic position, cognitive skills, and cultural capital can account for the attitudinal differences between educational groups. In order to do so, we use heteroskedastic ordered probit models, which enables us to simultaneously estimate both between- and within-group differences. Based on Dutch European Values Study data (1981-2017), we conclude that – overall – no educational polarization is taking place, and that educational differences in moral permissiveness are even decreasing, despite the fact that the higher educated are becoming more homogeneous in their permissiveness. However, with regard to political trust, we do observe growing between-group differences (but no increase in within-group homogeneity), which seem to be almost fully explained by differences in income and the possession of cultural capital between the lower and higher educated. Implications of these findings for the emergent diploma democracy are discussed.
12:00 – 13:00

Economic insecurity and attitudes towards Welfare

Chair: Edurne Bartolomé Peral (University of Deusto, Bilbao)

Not like us: income inequality, social distance and support for conditional unemployment benefits. A longitudinal cross-country analysis

Renzo Carriero, Marianna Filandri (Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Italy)

In this paper we investigate trends in support for conditional unemployment benefits across European countries. In a prior work (Carriero & Filandri 2018), we found that support for conditionality increased substantially from 1990 to 2008, becoming majoritarian in most European countries, except for Russia and Ukraine. Multilevel analyses revealed the role played by income inequality. The latter was interpreted, on the macro-level, as a social distance measure and an indicator of the operation of the identity criterion of deservingness. In societies where inequality increased, so did the support for conditional unemployment benefits because the majority of citizens became more distanced from the unemployed and hence less sympathetic. However, the impact of the great recession that began in 2008 has not been yet considered. With the release of 2017 data, we aim at replicating and extending our previous work and interpreting emerging trends. Our research questions are: Is the positive trend in support for conditionality still present in countries that have been hit more severely by the crisis? Is the role of inequality the same as that found in previous research? Are trends in countries where the worsening economic conditions were accompanied by concomitant increases in inequality different from those where the recession did not bring about increasing inequality? Moreover, using trend data on concerns with the unemployed people’s living conditions, the new EVS release will allow to test the mechanism through which income inequality increases social distance between the majority and the unemployed and in turn affects support for conditionality.

Ageing of Population and Social Justice

Julia Zelikova (Department of Comparative Political Studies - The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

This project focuses on justice between age groups and generation and bases on data of EVS project. This dimension of justice has become one of the major issues of contemporary societies. In the twenty-first century, class conflict seems to be defunct and its place taken over by generational conflict. There are moreover other cleavages that are usually categorized as “new” dimensions of inequality, for example, gender, ethnicity, race. And question is raised to what extent have the new intergenerational conflicts really crowded out traditional intragenerational ones? Issues of justice play an important role in adjudicating conflicts and legitimizing their solutions along all these cleavages. The contemporary history of the conflict dates from the
institutionalization of age-based social security. In all modern societies, the elderly are the main recipients of public income transfer programs, while children, even when taking child allowances and the costs of schooling into account, are to a large part financed privately by their parents. Such unequal allocation of public resources among age groups may be considered “unfair” or ineffective if, for example, its outcome is that one group is consistently worse off than another.

There are three basic principles by which distributive outcomes are justified: need, merit or desert (usually based on work performance), and equality (usually based on citizenship status). Their salience varies between countries, between groups of persons, and between the parts of the welfare state, but together they seem to exhaust most of the conceptual and empirical space of distributive justice. For the specific topic of justice between age groups and generations, it is first of all necessary to analytically separate these three dimensions. The conflict between generations may be caused by different understanding of role of state in the public distribution. This is a key question of this project.

**Social Responsibility of the State? The Welfare State and Legitimacy of the State**

*Michael Ochsner (FORS Lausanne and ETH Zurich, Switzerland)*

Europe has seen a rise of populist parties recently and, in some countries, democracy is at danger as country leaders extend their power, cutting back freedom of press and academia. These challenges to the legitimacy of the democratic state coincide with a long period of neoliberal ideology and new public management, which was often linked to a reduction in public service and cutbacks of social security. At the same time, there has been a severe economic crisis causing precarity.

My research asks whether, against the neoliberal paradigm, the state has a social responsibility for the weak. Is there a link between how people perceive the welfare state and the legitimacy of the state? Does this link differ between countries, controlled for several predictors of legitimacy? I will apply multilevel modeling as well as two step regression models (accounting for differences in determinants of legitimacy between countries) to the second release of EVS2017. Preliminary results with the first prerelease of the EVS2017 show that there is considerable variance between countries in perceived legitimacy. There is also variance in how much the confidence in the functioning of the social security system affects the perceived legitimacy of the state: In Eastern Europe, the effect of the confidence in the social security system on legitimacy is stronger while the level of confidence is lower; at the same time, the preference for a strong leader is more pronounced. The results thus suggest that investing in social solidarity might reinforce legitimacy of the democratic state.
**Keynote Speaker:**
*David Voas* (University College London) **The power of nones: Why secularization matters**

In her Presidential Address at the 2018 conference of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Korie Edwards urged social scientists to study the way that religion affects the distribution and use of power. In doing so, she criticized the amount of attention given to secularization. She advises scholars to avoid “framing our work in ways that could be construed to suggest that religion is losing power. This is simply not true.”

Using data from various sources, I will make four points in response:

1) Whether, why and to what extent religion is losing power is an empirical question. The evidence strongly suggests that in nearly all highly developed societies, religion is less central in personal and social life now than in the past.

2) The common claim that “the presuppositions that informed secularization theory have been effectively refuted” is odd, in view of the evident association between modernization and religious decline.

3) Scholars who are interested in the power of religious ideas, institutions and leaders should be attentive to studies of secularization; “The decline in power, popularity, and prestige of religion across the modern world is not a short-term or localized trend nor is it an accident” (Bruce 2011).

4) The undoubted power of religion can be deployed for good or ill, and there is a widespread belief that religion has done more harm than good. People are increasingly choosing to live without religion partly because they reject the exercise of its power over their own affairs.

**Selected contributions**

**Burning the bridge with the past: religion and national identity after the fall of the Berlin Wall**
*Francesco Molteni (University of Milan)*

The situation of the former communist countries represents an anomaly within the sociological debate about the various secularisation processes currently underway in Europe. In fact, there are evidences that religiosity in general and religious beliefs in particular have increased after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Two different interpretations can be advanced to read these trends. First, this religious resurgence
can be read as an augmented religious bricolage between traditional and new forms of religiosity. If
so, this personal and individualized religiosity is no longer based on church attendance, as many
results show. Second, religion can be used as a tool to rebuild a political, cultural and national
identity after the traumatic communist period. In the words of Borowik (2002) this supposed
revival is above all a return to tradition, a way to reconstruct a country’s collective memory, and a
way to reconnect to what existed before the regime.

This work aims exactly to shed light into this second interpretation. By applying multilevel
longitudinal models on the whole set of EVS data (including the second pre-release), the aim is to
inspect both the trends of religiosity and national belonging but, more importantly, how and if the
relation between the two has evolved over time. If the second interpretation for the increasing
religious trend is true, we should in fact expect a stronger interconnection between them in former
Communist countries after the fall of the Berlin wall.

**Does Atheism matter? – Atheism’s influence on homophobia in Europe – EVS data revisited**

*Jara Kampmann (GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)*

Quantitative research on Atheism is close to non-existent. Our aim is to redress this absence of
knowledge and understanding. In this paper we focus on attitudes, namely the relation between
Atheism and homophobia in Europe. Applying three-level multi-level-analysis to the longitudinal
European Values Study (1981-2008) we test whether Atheism exhibits an own effect on
homophobia after controlling for individual and societal factors. Our results are twofold. Firstly, yes,
Atheism matters. Atheists are significantly less homophobe than non-Atheists. Secondly, this result
can only be found for Western Europe. In addition we find a divide between former communist and
older democratic countries for the influence of the societal share of Atheists. These east/west
patterns might be empirical traces of the only theoretically described two different types of Atheism
postulated by Zuckerman (2007), where ‘organic’ Atheism prevails in Western Europe and mainly
‘coercive’ Atheism in Eastern Europe.

Preliminary analysis of the 17 countries (Germany is split into East and West) in the pre-released
5th wave of the EVS, shows that the described pattern seems to dissolve. In most of the Eastern
European countries Atheists are now also significantly less homophobe than non-Atheists.

**Dynamics of nationalism and pro-choice values relations: the cases of post-Soviet and Balkan
states**

*Veronica Kostenko (Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics, St.
Petersburgh)*

The revised modernization theory in Inglehart and Welzel’s version posits that economic stability
and no danger for survival lead to shift to emancipative values which are most pronounced across
generations, but even for one generation it can be well traced. Emancipative values embrace a set of
orientations, from more egalitarian gender attitudes to more cosmopolitan civic values. However,
this process is far from homogeneity, especially regarding societies where neither political nor economic stability characterize recent decades.

In this project I aim at tracing the relations between two concepts: nationalism and pro-choice values. Deploying the new data release of the European Values Study, I plan to show that close association of nationalistic feelings and restrictive position on justifiability of abortion, divorce, and homosexuality (or pre-marital sex for some sets of countries where the former is a constant, not a variable) is getting weaker with the course of time. I plan to draw specific attention to the regions that experienced secession (like former USSR and former Yugoslavia) where nationalism is being constantly harnessed by politicians to establish new nation-states.

16:25 – 17:45

Family, gender and generations
Chair: Ferruccio Biolcati Rinaldi (University of Milan)

Are family values multidimensional? Evidence from the last three decades in Europe
Zuzanna Brzozowska (Masaryk University and Vienna University of Economics and Business, Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital)

Although family values and their changes lie at the heart of family research, their operationalisation has drawn rather scant attention of family researchers. The existing but scattered evidence suggests family values consist of several dimensions changing at various pace. Yet, most analyses have ignored it: family values are usually defined either very narrowly, as answers to single questions, or very broadly, as a combination of answers to a battery of more- and less-closely linked questions. This might contribute to the weak empirical fit of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) concept, the to-go framework in family demography.

This paper aims to test the following hypothesis: family values comprise separate (inter-correlated but clearly distinguishable), and so reducing them to one single dimension leads to biased predictions of family change. It answers two research questions:
Q1: How coherent are family values?
Q2: How biased is the prediction of family changes when using one single family-value index as compared to separate indices for each dimension?
I address Q1 by performing factor analysis on a battery of attitudinal SDT-related questions taken from four EVS waves (1990, 1999, 2008 and 2017). This generates factor-analysis based indices of family values for each respondent. In order to answer Q2, I apply multivariate OLS country-level regression models and compare the performance of two kinds of family-value indices as predictors of family changes: one-dimensional (as commonly used in previous literature) and multi-dimensional (as computed within Q1) ones. The family-change indicators come from Eurostat, OECD
Gender-role attitudes are largely formed in the parental family because children see some definite distribution of gender roles. Also parents with different education and social status are likely to transmit different types of values to their children as higher education and social status lead to more egalitarian gender attitudes (Guiso et al. 2003; Van de Werfhorst, Kraaykamp 2001; Guveli, Need, De Graaf 2007; Cunningham 2008). At the same time current individual and context characteristics can have an impact upon gender-role attitudes. Theoretically, I base this research on the 'plethora of capitals' framework according to which the process of childbearing and socialization is regarded as investment (planned and unintentional) in different forms of capital. According to Bourdieu, children from wealthier, happier and more cultural families become more educated and cultural, because they have more favorable habitus (Bourdieu, 1986). In this research I extend this framework of Bourdieu by incorporating into analysis country characteristics such as GDP per capita, religious diversity index, etc. I argue that the process of socialization is affected not only by situation in the family but also in the society in general. The objective of this research is to reveal the impact of parental family on gender-role attitudes across European countries with different economic and cultural characteristics. Does the degree of parental family influence differ across European countries? Is the role of parental family strong or the current characteristics of the society is more important? The European Values Study 2017 is used as a dataset. Multilevel regression modeling is applied.

The new values for the new generation

Gevorg Poghosyan (Armenian National Academy of Sciences)

Several years ago we stated that a new generation is coming to the forefront in Armenia. Currently we can see that this new generation is already come. Today they are 22-25 years of age. It is a first generation of ‘non-Soviet’ young persons who were born and who grew up in independent Armenia. They have quite different values, another attitudes and own view of life. While older persons too took part in "Velvet Revolution" in 2018 in Armenia, the main activity and initiative came from young people. The initiative and actions originated with young people, with a new Armenian generation of independent state. Sometimes sociologists call them "Digital Generation", or children of Internet and Facebook. They learn a lot in their lives not from books and newspapers, but draw from the Internet. This is a generation of young people who have grown up in social networks. They are still more present in the virtual reality and communicate with each other more often through the social networks than in person, face to face. At the same time, these young people are deprived of many prohibitions, restrictions and "tabu", which were inherent to the Soviet youth. As sociological study of EVS 2017 show, their value system looks different than the generation of their parents and grandfathers. They are more focused on life success, on luck and career growth. They are much
more pragmatic than their parents. In their life plans for the future, they are largely oriented toward Western behavioral models and Western standards of life practice. We can say that there was a kind of "westernization" of our youth. They are different Armenians and they will be building different Armenia.

Aging and Ageism in Comparison  
*Ana Lortkipanidze (Georgian Opinion Research Business International, Tbilisi, Georgia)*

As nations develop, birthrates decline, and life expectancies increase, the aging of populations has become one of the most serious socioeconomic issues our time. Although by many indicators Georgia is less developed than northern and western European countries, its age structure is very similar. Mid-year projections for 2017 put the country at 21% aged 60 and above, while the U.N. estimates Europe as a whole to be at approximately 24%. Moreover, both in the 2008 EVS survey and among the 16 countries included in the 2017 pre-release, the Georgian population was most concerned about living conditions of older people. However, this concern does not mean that ageism is not an issue in the country; older couples are rarely seen displaying physical affection, there few organized social activities for the elderly, and older people in general are quite marginalized. I examine the contradictory nature of this reality, and compare the factors involved to those in other European countries.

Friday 11 October

9:00 – 11:00

Special session: Measurement equivalence and validity in cross-cultural research  
Chair: Dominique Joyce (FORS, and University of Lausanne)

Keynote speakers:  
*Christian Welzel* (Chair in Political Culture Research, Center for the Study of Democracy at Leuphana University, and Vice-President of World Values Survey Association) -  
*Measurement Equivalence? A Tale of False Obsessions and a Cure*

During the last decade, Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA) has risen to the unchallenged gold standard of establishing measurement equivalence in cross-cultural research. A key premise of MGCFA is that multi-item constructs are incomparable between countries when their
dimensional cohesions within countries are dissimilar. We argue that this comparability logic is lopsided because, in fact, dimensional cohesions within countries are incomparable between countries. The reason is a simple, albeit largely unknown, principle: how strongly coherent a construct can appear within countries is a function of the country means’ scale positions. Indeed, as country means approach the extreme ends of a closed scale, dimensional cohesion statistics deteriorate and make the respective construct appear less coherent. But this impression is deceptive because the correlation calculus that underlies every dimensional analysis operates within narrower margins as country means turn more extreme. Hence, seeming variability in dimensional cohesions is an altogether inconclusive indication under greatly varying country means. Because of that, such variability proves irrelevant to measurement equivalence properly understood—which is present when similar overall scores on a construct map in similar fashion on other variables of interest. We exemplify the latter point using a most prominent victim of MGCFA-based incomparability verdicts: the Emancipative Values Index (EVI). Our insights re-enforce Welzel and Inglehart’s conclusion that the comparability of multi-item constructs should be judged by their predictive powers across countries, instead of their dimensional cohesions within countries, even more so in recognition of the fact that these two criteria operate against each other.

Bart Meuleman (Coordinator of the Centre for Sociological Research at KU Leuven, and Past President of the European Survey Research Association) - Measurement equivalence: Between Statistical Dogmatism and Anything Goes

Over the past decades, tests for measurement equivalence have become increasingly popular in cross-national and cross-cultural research. Among various techniques (see van de Vijver et al. 2019 for an overview), multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) has become the method of choice to assess whether survey instruments can successfully travel linguistic and cultural borders (Davidov et al. 2014). The spread of this technique has contributed importantly to the concern for and understanding of the issue of comparability of measurements.

At the same time, however, the increased popularity of assessing measurement equivalence has brought along several challenges. First of all, many frequently-used instruments are found to violate (stricter levels of) equivalence, leaving researchers with puzzlement about the comparability of their valued survey data, and with uncertainty as to whether they could safely perform cross-group comparisons. Second, the rather technical nature of equivalence testing has stimulated the measurement literature to focus almost exclusively on statistical details, while neglecting the question of theoretical validity. As a reaction to these trends, some voices have called for ‘a paradigm shift’ away from the current practice of MGCFA-based equivalence testing (Welzel & Inglehart 2016; Welzel, Brunker, Inglehart & Kruse 2019).

In this contribution, I argue that the paradigm shift proposed by Welzel and colleagues throws out the baby with the bathwater; but that it is nevertheless useful to revisit the logic of equivalence testing. The presentation outlines the epistemological foundations of equivalence testing and its operationalization into concrete statistical procedures. By doing so, I show that some criticisms are based on misconceptions about measurement, while others can be addressed within the current
framework of measurement equivalence.

Selected papers:

**Cross-national and cross-level measurement equivalence of choice and gender equality values in the EVS 2017**  
*Boris Sokolov (NRU HSE)*

In this project, I want to test for two different types of measurement invariance of two components of Welzel’s emancipative values (Welzel 2013), known as [pro]-choice values and [gender] equality values. Choice values reflect how permissible people in different countries find sexual self-determination in such matters as homosexuality, abortion and divorce. In turn, equality values measure how much emphasize respondents put on gender equality in such spheres as education, job market, and political leadership. Welzel’s Emancipative Values Index (EVI) was recently criticized for the lack of cross-cultural measurement invariance (Alemán and Woods 2016), which, according to the current methodological standards, means also lack of cross-cultural comparability for the EVI. Sokolov (2018), however, showed that for choice values approximate measurement invariance holds in a cross-national perspective. He also noted that “perceptions of issues related to gender equality can also be cognitively equivalent across different cultures” (Op. cit., 406). This study is aimed at further elaboration of the issue of cross-national measurement invariance of these two components of the EVI, with the use of multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis and the data from the latest, 2017 round of the EVS. In addition, using multilevel confirmatory factor analysis, it will for the first time test for cross-level invariance of choice values and equality values, an important methodological assumption ensuring that individual-level and country-level scores on the respective constructs have a similar substantive meaning and scale of measurement.

**Gender role attitudes in EVS2017: is the measurement improved?**  
*Vera Lomazzi (GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)*

Gender role attitudes are often defined as the cognitive representation of what is believed appropriate for male and female roles. Several survey programmes include measurements of gender role attitude but, despite their large use in substantive research, such measurement is often problematic and the cross-cultural comparison may be put at risk of misleading results. Such weakness ranges from the inadequacy of the instruments, which often neglect the multidimensional nature of this concept; the strong accent only on female roles; the main focus on the private sphere overlooking attitudes towards roles in the public realm; outdated formulations; the lack of measurement equivalence in cross-cultural settings.

Previous research based on the scale implemented in the previous waves of EVS/WVS and ISSP addressed the change of a new scale used in the recent EVS2017. Even if the item formulations could still considered a bit outdated and the focus is kept on women’s roles, the new scale is promising. Preliminary analyses carried out on data from the first release confirm the bi-dimensionality of the scale, being able to cover both private and public sphere. The scale results
from a reasoned selection of items of previous wave of EVS but also from WVS and ISSP. This potentially increases the possibilities for cross-sectional research. However, the suitability for comparative studies still needs to be tested.
In addition to the review of the measurement of gender role attitudes, this contribution assess its equivalence across the 30 countries included in the second pre-release by using start-of-the-art techniques, such as the alignment procedure.

11:30 – 12:15

Dealing with non-response and interview falsification
Chair: Ruud Luijkx (Tilburg University, University of Trento)

Dynamics of Interview Falsification
Lucy Flynn (Georgian Opinion Research Business International, Tbilisi, Georgia)

Interview falsification can be a serious problem when conducting surveys, yet it is relatively unstudied. GORBI’s review of the interviews rejected during our 2017 EVS fieldwork suggests that one interviewer demographic is significantly more likely to falsify interviewers; however, the finding was easily explained. In order to conduct a broader analysis of interview falsification, we focused on a neighboring country where we recently conducted a survey via a new local partner, with a sample design and fieldwork procedures identical to that of EVS.
I will first outline GORBI’s measures used to verify both procedural quality and answers to survey questions, specifically for CAPI. I will then explain the source of interview falsification in the 2017 EVS survey, and compare that to those in the more recent survey utilizing the same methodology. I will discuss implications for EVS surveys, including a suggestion for future waves.

How predictable is item non-response in Georgia?
Dustin Gilbreath (CRRC-Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia)

Item non response is a problem every pollster faces. But what variables are associated with non-response in Georgia? This presentation will build on an analysis of Caucasus Barometer 2017 data which showed that ethnic minority status, settlement type, age, sex, education level, and whether or not there were people present besides the interviewer and respondent are associated with don’t know response levels. In contrast, the same analysis showed that refuse to answer responses were only associated with settlement type and the presence of individuals besides the interviewer and respondent during the interview. Using EVS data, this paper will replicate the previous analysis to explore the external validity of the past analysis and what this implies for social survey practitioners.

13:30 – 15:10
Support for radical populism grew in many countries, having an impact on individuals’ political choices and on political decision making. The literature points out to two dimensions as basic ingredients of populism: anti-establishment attitudes and out-group exclusionism. The first dimension refers to the preference for technocrats, rejection of corrupt political elites and support for direct democracy, while the second opposes the in-group to the out-group, the opposition “us” against “them” being built on various boundaries (e.g. ethnic, religious, attitudes toward corruption). Existing research shows that anti-establishment attitudes prevail in South America, whereas in Western Europe and North America the populist discourse is built around anti-immigration attitudes. In post-communist countries exclusionism is the main ingredient of populism and in Romania the main inter-group boundary is drawn by religion.

Using data from European Values Study (2018) and World Values Survey (2013), we built a measurement model of populism in Romania. We checked the measurement equivalence of the model in both 2013 and 2018, using structural equation models. Our preliminary results indicate that the measurement equivalence over time is only partially met, the loadings of anti-immigrant and anti-establishment attitudes growing under the impact of political and social changes. At the same time, the loading of religious exclusionism and intolerance towards out-group remain high and stable over time. Results are further discussed in comparison with other post-communist societies, depending on the data availability in the second pre-release of EVS 2017.

PRESENT CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN VALUES
Hristo P. Todorov (New Bulgarian University, Sofia)

With respect to the so called “populist moment” currently it is often said that main European values are threatened. In my paper I’ll try to question whether three core European values – independence of a person, toleration and respect for law – have been derogated under the pressure of populist propaganda. My intention is, using the second pre-release of EVS2017 to make a comparison between Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria. This comparison is both possible and useful because of some similarities. The three countries are geographically in the same region. They have similar languages and cultures. They have communist past and are members of the EU. At the same time there are also some significant differences. Slovenia and Croatia were part of former Yugoslavia while Bulgaria was a satellite state of USSR. The three countries joined the EU to different times – Slovenia in 2004, Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The broader question that should be answered is whether the public opinion in the three countries is affected by the rise of populism.
The conditional effects of the economic insecurity on the voting for the populist parties in the European Union

Olga Lavrinenko (Polish Academy of Sciences)

This research contributes to the debates on the economic insecurity and the cultural backlash as the explanatory frameworks for the rise of populism across the European Union (EU). I assume that the economic insecurity operationalized as the regional unemployment rate change moderates the effects of 1) the confidence towards the national and the EU institutions, 2) the attitudes towards migrants, 3) the materialist/post-materialist index, on the voting for a populist party. In order to test the moderation effects, I run two-level linear regression and impute three cross-level interaction terms between the unemployment rate change and 1) confidence towards the national institutions and the EU, 2) attitudes towards migrants, 3) materialist/post-materialist index.

I draw on the EU member countries data from the European Values Study (EVS) (fourth wave 2008 and fifth wave 2017) on confidence towards the national governments, parliaments and the EU; materialist/post-materialist index; attitudes towards migrants; age and education (control variables). Consequently, the voting outcomes from the last national elections before the completion of the EVS fieldworks in 2008 and 2017 are selected. From the national electoral data, the mean voting for the populist parties was estimated. The classification of the parties as populist comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The data on the regional unemployment rate change originates from the Eurostat. Thus I use cross-sectional data controlling for time trends.

Remitting populism?

Bogdan Voicu (Romanian Academy/Research Institute for Quality of Life)

This proposal considers the consequences of populism for citizens’ attitudes in a double non-standard way. On one hand, it looks at the negative political remittances of non-democratic orientations in host countries, and assesses their consequences on attitudes of those left behind in their country of origin. On the other hand, it discusses the consequences of populism on citizens attitudes, but in this case it is about citizens of other countries. The empirical data is provided by EVS 2008-2009, EVS 2017-2018 and the EVS Romanian data set, and the paper checks if support for non-democratic ruling in host countries of Romanian migrants is reflected in the view about society of those in contact with migrated friends and relatives. Changing in the impact of the pre-crisis and post-crisis cultures on current-days individual values are also considered.
Who do you prefer not to have as a neighbour? An “immigrant” or a “foreign worker”? 
Evidence from a survey experiment in the Italian edition of the European Values Study 
World Values Survey 2017
Ferruccio Biolicati Rinaldi, Riccardo Ladini (University of Milan)

Since in recent years the salience of the immigration issue has largely increased in Western Europe, it is of particular interest to assess the current level of natives’ social distance towards immigrants. In the European Values Study, the most suitable item to measure it brings together different dimensions, by asking individuals whether they would like or not to have "immigrants/foreign workers" as neighbours. Nonetheless, especially in a period where the media tend to refer to immigrants as refugees and not as workers of other nationalities, that item could lead to misleading results since individuals could give a different weight to the “immigrants” and “foreign workers” labels. By means of an experiment in the Italian edition of the European Values Study - World Values Survey 2017, our work aims at overcoming that issue. The experiment consists in randomly varying the formulation of the item: 70% of the sample receives the standard item, while the remaining part of the sample is respectively assigned to "foreign workers" (15% of the sample) or "immigrants" (15% of the sample) items.

Our contribution has a twofold aim. Substantially, we identify and quantify the possible presence of a larger social distance towards those who are simply defined as immigrants, under the assumption that a foreigner is more tolerated when identified as a worker. Methodologically, the work intends to offer a starting point for reflection on the wording of questions on attitudes toward migrants in comparative surveys, by pointing out some limitations of the existent items.

Civic and ethnic ethos and attitudes toward immigrants
Horatiu M. Rusu (“Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, Romania)

Dichotomies such as <<civic – ethnic>> or <<West and East>> are expressing a long history of theoretical debates on nationalisms (e.g. Kohn, 1944, 1965; Schopflin, 1996). Smith (1986, 1991) for instance argues the former divide is a valid and useful dichotomy and suggest that entire nations are of civic or ethnic type. Jones and Smith (2001a, 2001b) find evidence of an ascriptive (resembling ethnic) and voluntarist (resembling civic) divide of identity. On the other hand, Schulman (2002), suggests a three-folded reality: civic, ethnic and cultural (see also Janmaat, 2006) and argues that a civic-West and ethnic-East dichotomy is just an oversimplified view of the empirical reality. Although far from the viewpoint that entire nations are either of civic or ethnic types, this paper acknowledges that some Herderian or Renanian tendencies exist across and within countries and adopt three goals. Firstly, it investigates whether the last decade of increasing populist nationalist rhetoric, that we find in most EU states, is grounded on new attitudes reflecting the above divides. Secondly, assuming that the boundaries between these dimensions are rather blurred, it will seek to construct an indicator capturing the differences between the most salient measures of civic versus ethnic criteria. Thirdly, it considers Hobsbawm (1991: 164) suggestion that all states are officially nations and virtually all states seek to keep out foreigners and will search for evidences of different
links with tolerance toward strangers/attitudes towards immigrants while controlling for the most common confounders. EVS2017 data will be used to explore if, how and in which countries these (civic/ethnic) divides holds true and if and what dynamics and links exists. Cluster and SEM will be employed. Data from previous EVS waves are also employed as additional source for exploring the first research question. The paper will add new insights to previous studies (Heath and Tilley, 2005; Byrne and Dixon, 2013; McAllister, 2016) providing mixed (positive, neutral, negative) evidence of the relations of civic / ethnic (and cultural) emphasis of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants.

**Hostility towards immigrants: Economic and Cultural Threat perceptions as causes in times of the economic crises and rising numbers of immigration**

*Kathrin B. Busch (GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)*

From an economic perspective, Western European societies need immigration: Societies are aging, and for many industrial sectors, the native supply of labor is not sufficient, anymore. Despite these developments of capitalist societies, it is unclear how ready Europeans are in general to accept and willfully integrate people from other nations and different cultural backgrounds: While numbers in immigration to many European countries have risen in the past couple of years, also populist radical right parties have gained ground in elections. Although reasons to support these parties may differ between countries, one of their shared distinctive topos – the propagation of nativism – leads to the expectation that these parties' increase in popularity is partly due to a grown hostility against immigrants. Also, past research has shown that perceptions of personal threat can be a cause for turning against an out-group and hence be a reason for a person's increase in right-wing (authoritarian) attitudes (Asbrock and Frische, 2013). On the other hand, research following contact theory predicts that good contact buffers threat perceptions' effect on hostility against immigrants (e.g., McLaren 2003). Against this background the present proposal will use data from the EVS longitudinal file and from 2019 to 1.) show how the economic and the cultural threat perceptions have developed within European societies over time, with a focus on the economic crises and increase in immigration. 2.) Multilevel analyses will be used to analyze if economic and cultural threat perceptions have led to an increase in social hostility against different groups of immigrants and what role effects of the crises have. It is expected that the increase in immigration and economic decrease only significantly increase hostility against immigrants for those individuals who share these threat perceptions.